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Abstract 
In a panel comprising 61 countries covering the years 1980-2010 we show that macroeconomic variables 
such as GDP and real-interest rates lose potency as systemic banking crisis determinants when estimated 
over a full business cycle and that the choice of panel time-span is of high relevance. Using a shorter 
panel (1998-2011) involving 75 countries, we show that sectoral variables such as Bank Z-Score, private-
credit-to-GDP ratio, bank credit-to-deposit ratio and non-performing loan levels represent an improved 
model-fit over their macroeconomic-focused counterparts, yielding improved in-sample crisis predictions. 
Whereas sectoral-centric models may over-estimate the likelihood of systemic banking crises this does not 
constitute a model weakness if not overlooking embryonic crises is the key objective. Future research is 
facilitated via the establishment of a control cluster of determinants with both sectoral as well as 
macroeconomic constituents. 
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1. Introduction 
The weaknesses of the regulatory framework for banks, as encapsulated within the, then 
prevailing, Basel II accord, became glaringly obvious as the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 
2008 unfolded and wealth levels in many countries reduced dramatically. Since then academics 
and regulatory authorities have focused upon identifying key regulatory gaps as well as 
recommending appropriate new measures geared toward ensuring such a crisis could not be 
repeated in future (see Bank for International Settlements (2010), Wellink 2009) and 
Brunnermeier et al. (2009). Prior to 2008 banks were generally risk-assessed on a micro-
prudential basis, where market-based measures such as Value-at-Risk and institutional measures 
such as loan write-off ratios formed the basis for bank credit-worthiness ratings (see Jorion 
(2007) and Hoggarth et al. (2005)). But to assess risk, and especially systemic risk (i.e. involving 
externalities), on a bank-by-bank basis and to conclude that the system is safe so long as each 
individual institution appears to be safe is to overlook important aspects of systemic risk. Banks 
can behave in systemically risky ways even though they appear to be sound from a micro-
prudential perspective (see Brunnermeier et al. (2009) and Goodhart (2008)).  
Given the failure of pre-2008 stress-testing models and the prevailing regulatory framework, 
coupled with the criticism levelled at the post-crisis regulatory community’s response, it is 
important that we understand how and why the 2008 crisis was so unexpected and if there are 
lessons that can be learned to help shape future policy initiatives (see Flannery (2009), Haldane 
(2010), Goodhart (2008), Brunnermeier et al. (2009) and Duttweiler (2010)). 
The purpose of this paper is to re-examine the determinants of systemic banking crises in the 
wake of the GFC placing a particular emphasis on identifying those sectoral factors most closely 
associated with such crises. These are more amenable to regulatory-control than their 
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macroeconomic counterparts which, by now, are well-established in the literature (see Diamond 
and Dybvig (1983), Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998, 2002), Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2006) 
and Eichler and Sobański (2012)).   
In so doing we extend the work of Barrell et al. (2010) to include not just OECD countries but 
focusing specifically upon systemic banking crises as per the most up-to-date database available 
(see Laeven and Valencia (2013)).1 Our primary objective is to identify and establish the most 
important bank balance-sheet-based (i.e. sectoral) variables which are most closely associated 
with systemic banking crises. We make use of other recently-available bank-related databases for 
this purpose (see Cihák et al. (2013) and Barth et al. (2013)). However before we can establish 
whether or not these sectoral variables are comparable with their macroeconomic counterparts 
we are obliged to first replicate the work of Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998, 2002) and 
then to extend their analysis to a period that includes the 2008 GFC.  
By so doing we are able to empirically test and report on the following questions: 1)  whether or 
not the previously-established macroeconomic determinants retain their significance over a 
longer period (30 years) than has been examined to-date, 2) whether established systemic-crisis 
determinants are sensitive to the business cycle or whether they hold generally in the long-run, 3) 
which sectoral variables are most informative in terms of helping to predict systemic crises and 
4) how sectoral variables compare with macroeconomic variables in terms of in-sample crisis 
prediction? Our results should provide guidance towards the recalibration of stress-tests and 
other early-warning systems as the lessons of the GFC continue to be absorbed.2 We find that 
previously-established macroeconomic crisis determinants, such as the level of real-interest rates, 
                                                     
1 In their paper the authors include systemic as well as non systemic crises in their logit model’s dependent variable 
2 Throughout the paper a reference to a crisis or bank crisis is intended to mean a systemic bank crisis. The shorter 
form is used for readability purposes. The definition of what constitutes a systemic bank crisis is described in the 
literature review of Chapter 2 (see section 2.2). 
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lose explanatory power in the long run and that inflation loses its significance entirely. Whereas 
in the short run (i.e. over a 14 year period spanning the GFC) macroeconomic factors remain 
significant, in models where they are augmented / replaced by sectoral variables such models 
perform at least equally as well in terms of predicting in-sample crises. We demonstrate that 
where shorter panels are used the choice of time-span / business cycle is highly relevant. From a 
sectoral perspective we find the most important determinants to be: 1) levels of private credit 
extended to borrowers, 2) bank distance-to-default as measured by aggregate Z-score and 3) 
bank non-performing loan levels.  
As part of global efforts geared towards avoiding any recurrence of a crisis on the scale of the 
GFC researchers are adopting new systemic banking risk indices. A useful leading signal of crises 
ought to reflect and quantify the accumulation of systemic risk over time prior to the onset of a 
crisis and thus could augment future stress-test models. New measures to enhance / supersede 
value-at-risk (VaR) have been proposed. Acharya et al. (2010) recommend Systemic Expected 
Shortfall, whereas Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) favour a measured termed Delta CoVaR.3 
Our contribution lies in enabling researchers to ascertain the empirical relationship between any 
proposed systemic risk measure (SRM) and the sectoral crisis determinants we identify. In turn 
this will help establish which SRM is most appropriate for a particular country based upon the 
composition of that country’s banking sector (see Wosser 2015a). Our final contribution is to 
establish what we term a “control cluster” of up-to-date crisis determinants which will facilitate an 
in-depth analysis of the effectiveness of the regulatory communities’ response to the GFC (see 
Wosser 2015b).  
                                                     
3 Systemic Expected Shortfall attempts to estimate the degree to which banks may be undercapitalised during crises 
periods. Delta-CoVaR measures the value-at-risk distributional shift that occurs within the returns of the financial 
sector as a whole conditional upon institution “i” meeting or exceeding its individual 1% value at risk.  
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This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we present a review of the econometric 
methodology, with our data described in section 3. Detailed results are provided in section 4. An 
outline of the robustness checks carried out is provided in section 5 with section 6 concluding. 
2. Methodology 
To test whether a regulatory measure represents a systemic banking crisis determinant we use a 
pooled logit model (see Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), Beck et al. (2006) and Von 
Hagen and Ho (2007)). Here the dependent variable P(i,t) is a dummy variable that has a value of 
“1” if country “i” experiences a systemic banking crisis in year “t” and “0” otherwise. The 
coefficients are determined by maximising the following log likelihood function:                          
Argmax(β):           .        (1.1) 
Here Xi,t represents a vector of explanatory variables (which can be either macroeconomic 
factors or Balance sheet metrics), β is a vector of K unknown coefficients and F(Xi,tβ) is the 
cumulative probability distribution function evaluated at Xi,tβ. In this model F is logistic and is 
evaluated as                . 
T represents the number of years covered by the panel and N the number of countries. The use 
of the logit model is widespread and remains preferred whenever country panels form the basis 
of the crisis-determinants analysis (see Davis and Karim (2008)). The sign of coefficient βi 
illustrates whether a variable contributes positively or negatively to the odds of a systemic crisis 
and the p-value for each βi indicates whether or not the corresponding factor is statistically 
significant at1%, 5% and 10% levels. Each regression is estimated with cluster-controlled 
standard errors.  Fixed-effects regressions are not utilised because they force the removal of non-
changing data (by country) from the analysis. Therefore a country would have to be excluded if it 
didn’t experience a crisis, restriction which results in the loss of significant amounts of relevant 
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data. As per Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), once a country has experienced its first 
systemic crisis all subsequent panel rows relating to that country are excluded from our 
regressions. Doing so mitigates a modelling criticism that dependent variable and explanatory 
variables become jointly-determined (endogenous) once a systemic crisis has emerged. 
3. Data 
To undertake our analysis we use two separate but related panels. Panel A aims to replicate, by 
country / year composition, the original panel formulated by Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 
(1998) which covered the period 1980-1994. However Panel A also includes data up to 2010 as 
required for our analysis. We have tweaked the composition of Panel A slightly compared with 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache’s (1998) panel. Whereas Chile, Peru and Turkey formed part of 
the 1998 panel those countries were not included in any of the regressions we 
replicate.4Consequently, these countries are omitted from Panel A. Furthermore, in 1996, Zaire 
disintegrated politically and was reconstituted as the Democratic Republic of Congo. However 
this event resulted in several data anomalies which cannot be reconciled back to the original data 
for Zaire, therefore the Democratic Republic of Congo is also omitted.5 The countries are listed 
in alphabetical order with mean, min and max values per country for the key macroeconomic 
variables of interest. These include GDP growth-rate, real-interest rate, inflation, M2 money to 
foreign exchange reserves ratio and private-credit-to-GDP ratio. A sectoral variable, i.e. private-
credit-growth-rate is also included as it formed part of Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache’s (1998) 
analysis.  
                                                     
4 These are regressions 1) to 3) of Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) Table 2. Sectoral data for these countries 
could not be adequately sourced for the sample period we investigate. 
5 We included this country as part of our robustness checks and noted that its inclusion does not materially impact 
our key findings.   
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We present summary data for Panel A in Table 1 below. Column 2 depicts the systemic crisis 
episodes by country and year as originally defined by Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998). 
This data, based upon an earlier survey conducted by Caprio and Klingebiel (1996), underpins 
their logit model’s dependent variable and we re-constitute it for result replication purposes. 
However their definition of what constitutes a systemic banking crisis has been criticised for being 
somewhat subjective (see Eichler and Sobański (2012)). Instead, we utilise a comprehensive 
systemic financial crisis database (see Laeven and Valencia (2013)), made available under the 
auspices of the IMF. This establishes precisely when systemic crisis episodes occurred in country 
/ year pairings based upon detailed specific criteria. Thus, a systemic banking crisis is defined 
more objectively as an event meeting only two conditions; 1) there are significant signs of 
financial distress in the banking system (as indicated by significant bank runs, losses in the 
banking system, and/or bank liquidations) and 2) significant banking policy intervention 
measures in response to significant losses in the banking system are evident. 
Both of these conditions are objective rather than subjective, therefore the dataset represents a 
benchmark for future research employing pooled logit techniques where the dependent variable 
is driven by consistent globally-applicable criteria.  We detail the systemic crisis episodes as per 
Laeven and Valencia’s (2013) database in column 3. Having replicated the Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache (1998) results we rely exclusively upon this column for all subsequent Panel A 
analysis. The summary statistics show that up to 29 systemic crisis episodes were identified in 
1998, whereas Laeven and Valencia (2013) now identify 57 crises over the extended 1980-2010 
period. The overall summary statistics relate to the full 1980-2010 time frame. All countries 
experience positive GDP growth of 3.5% on average with average inflation of 10.5%. M2-
money-to-foreign-exchange-reserves is used to assess the potential exposure of countries to 
sudden capital outflows (see Calvo (1998) and Bruno and Shin (2013)). Over our sample this 
averages at 60 times foreign reserves. Private-credit-to-GDP ratio has an average of 54%, 
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however average credit growth of 9.5% is reported over this period, representing almost 3 times 
the corresponding GDP growth-rate. This increase in leverage is considered by many to be one 
of the major sources of systemic risk, especially when it outstrips the GDP growth rate over the 
same period (see Brunnermeier et al. (2009)). We also note that average inflation-adjusted 
interest rates are a modest 1.98%, this being a signal that high rates are unlikely to feature as 
crisis determinants in our study. However there is considerable variation across the countries 
making up our sample and the standard deviation of inflation is just under 9%. Overall, Panel A 
comprises 61 countries with up to 1830 observations depending upon the particular regression 
specification.  
In terms of the key variables outlined in Table 1 we focus upon those which, if subjected to a 
large shock, are theorised to adversely impact bank asset values.6 Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache (1998) believe these to be inextricably linked to GDP growth-rate disturbances, the 
consequences of which are assumed to be: 1) lack of investor confidence, 2) downturn in the 
business cycle leading to reduced investment activity, 3) higher unemployment levels and 4) 
increasing inability of borrowers to meet repayment obligations. As asset values decline investors 
are less inclined to meet payment obligations, therefore non-performing loan levels rise. Because 
banks often rely upon inter-bank deposits as a primary source of funding an unexpected increase 
in real-interest rates reduces the repayment capacity of borrowers and increases bank operating 
costs via higher weighted-average cost of capital. Rates shocks can also make private-sector 
investment projects more difficult to justify via increased hurdle rates. The overall impact entails 
reduced asset values (mark-to-market accounting requires that revenue streams be reappraised 
                                                     
6 Under fair value accounting rule 157 (FAS 157) banks must mark asset values to market, therefore any asset 
valuation disturbances must immediately be reflected in their balance sheets. Brunnermeier et al. (2009) recommend 
a relaxation / suspension of FAS 157 to help prevent short-term liquidity issues spiralling into asset valuation / 
insolvency crises. 
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using higher discount factors), increased loan default rates and lower or non-existent bank 
profits.  
According to Fisher (1930) interest rates and inflation are indelibly linked, therefore inflationary 
measures are included as part of the analysis. M2 money to foreign exchange reserves level is 
included because it is a proxy variable for banks’ exposure to unexpected capital outflows 
following an unexpected devaluation of the local currency. In turn, capital flows have been 
shown to be associated with past financial crises, where large outflows have been observed 
during periods when bank credit-worthiness issues emerged (see Calvo (1998), Lane and 
McQuade (2014) and Bruno and Shin (2013)). As short-term inter-bank funding weakens and/or 
becomes more expensive banks may be forced to de-leverage their balance sheets by selling off 
assets, often all of them acting in unison. Thus funding-liquidity shortages may drive asset de-
leveraging spirals to such an extent that asset values fall (sometimes temporarily) below liabilities 
and banks become insolvent (see Brunnermeier et al. (2009)). 
Private-credit-to-GDP and private-credit-growth-rates feature because, during business cycle 
upswings, the level of private credit in an economy drives bank revenues and, in turn, earnings. 
Private credit levels reflect current asset valuations and investment appetite. They also help fuel 
asset “bubbles”. Theory suggests that where economies become increasingly leveraged relative to 
GDP, systemic risk is increasing. 
Other factors included in Panel A but which demonstrate weak crisis explanatory power are 
outlined for the sake of completeness and because they form part of our efforts to replicate (and 
extend) the results of Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998). Bank profitability can be 
adversely affected whenever there is an unexpected mismatch between expected return-on-assets 
and cost of capital. If banks raise finance in a foreign currency but lend predominantly locally, 
then an unexpected depreciation of a country’s currency reduces the value of any assets held in 
the local currency whilst increasing debt service costs. Therefore a measure of currency 
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depreciation is considered. A deposit-insurance dummy variable, taking the value of “1” if the 
deposits of a country’s banking system are insured and “0” otherwise, is included to test 
Diamond and Dybvig’s (1983) theory that bank runs constitute a primary source of systemic risk. 
Budgetary-surplus-to-GDP ratios are included because theory suggests that stable economies, 
where inflation levels remain under control and where borrower credit-worthiness concerns are 
moderate, are less likely to experience systemic banking shocks. Finally terms-of-trade-
deterioration is included as a result of its pre-1998 significance in earlier papers (see Caprio and 
Klingebiel (1996) and Gorton (1988)).7   
Our second panel, Panel B, is similar in certain respects to the first in that many of the countries 
from Panel A are retained, along with Panel A’s most significant explanatory variables. The 
purpose of maintaining a second panel is to enable higher levels of scrutiny regarding the role 
played by (recently-available) sectoral variables as systemic crisis determinants (see Cihák et 
al.(2013) and Laeven and Valencia (2013)).   
However, in contrast with Panel A, those variables with poorly-demonstrated explanatory power 
are omitted, as are countries with sparsely-reported sectoral data. New countries are added in line 
with geo-political developments such as the collapse of the Soviet Bloc. Panel B is shallower than 
Panel A in that it only spans the period 1998-2011. This is necessary because of a shortage of 
generally available bank-sector data, including important variables such as Tier-1 capital ratios, 
Bank Z-scores (i.e. distance-to-default) and risk-weighted assets prior to 1998 (this being the year 
they were introduced as part of the amended Basel I accord, Basel II).  The capital-to-asset ratio 
(CAR, sometimes called leverage ratio) is included because of its regulatory importance. It 
reflects the level of bank credit extended per unit of capital held.  
                                                     
7 See Appendices for a list and description of the variables used in this paper 
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Theory reflects how sectoral shocks impact bank non-performing loan levels (NPL). If NPL 
increases banks may often experience large trading losses, which in turn must be absorbed by 
bank capital or reserves. If losses become so severe that capital is fully depleted then the bank is 
insolvent and must be “resolved”, a euphemistic term that can have several meanings such as 
“wound up”, “nationalised”, “re-capitalised” or some combination of the three. A bank’s Z-
score is a measure of distance-to-default.8 The higher the Z-score the further the distance-to-
default becomes, therefore we anticipate a significantly negative coefficient reported in our 
regressions.  
Notable by its absence in many of the studies described earlier is an examination of liquidity 
from a systemic risk perspective. Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) include a liquidity 
measure in their regressions, this being the ratio of liquid bank assets to total assets, but this ratio 
is shown to be insignificant from a crisis perspective. We therefore consider two alternative 
liquidity measures, both of which include bank deposits based on the following rationale. The 
bank credit-to-deposit ratio (a.k.a. loans-to-deposits) is one such measure and is also an 
alternative (to CAR) leverage measure. Similar to the credit-to-GDP ratio described above, the 
greater the leverage the higher the risk-exposure to sharp asset-value reductions and the greater 
the dependency upon debt (or Repos see Duffie (2010)) as a finance instrument. In recent years, 
as central banks have strived to maintain low inflation and interest rates (see Table 1 summary 
information), debt financing has become more expensive than deposit financing, even taking 
debt tax shields into account, therefore higher leverage is associated with higher risk exposure. 
However, in circumstances where there is a tightening of liquidity and/or concerns over bank 
credit-worthiness, mark-to-market accounting rules and higher margin-posting requirements can 
cause liquidity shocks to eventually worsen to such an extent that inter-bank activity disappears 
                                                     
8 Calculated as (ROAi,t + CARi,t) / StDev(ROA) where ROA is return on assets and CAR is the capital-to-assets 
ratio for country “i” in year “t”.  
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entirely, i.e. the “credit crunch” phenomenon now synonymous with the GFC. Likewise, the 
deposits-to-total-assets ratio is another liquidity measure, but one which includes non-loan-
related assets in the denominator. Examples of this class of assets are Government bonds, 
subsidiary holdings and ownership positions taken in other firms or ventures. In theory this 
ratio’s asset base represents more highly-diversified assets, thereby lowering the overall risk 
profile of banks. 
Tier-1 capital is high-quality (unencumbered capital plus highly liquid reserves) capital as a 
proportion of risk-weighted assets. Its purpose is to absorb unexpected bank losses and to shield 
depositors and their insurance underwriters (usually the sovereign) from large shocks. Regulatory 
authorities place great emphasis on monitoring minimum standards for this measure and have 
ratcheted up minimum Tier-1 capital levels over the years. Opinion is divided on this 
microprudential measure. Regulatory authorities such as the Basel Committee for Banking 
Supervision (BCBS) believe higher Tier-1 capital helps to stabilise banking systems (see Wellink 
(2009) and Bank for International Settlements (2011a)). Others believe that by increasing 
minimum capital levels, meeting return-on-equity (ROE) analyst expectations requires a 
corresponding increase in earnings, causing bank managers to adopt more risky loan and 
investment portfolios (see Brunnermeier et al. (2009) and Wosser (2015b)). Net-interest-margins 
are included as they are proxy variables for earnings generally whilst simultaneously capturing an 
aspect of interest rate risk. The sample average of 4%, coupled with a small standard deviation of 
2.5% illustrates how difficult it is for banks to generate large earnings from their traditional 
lending activities, especially in the context of low GDP growth levels (see Table 1 summary). 
We also examine other sectoral variables not summarised in Table 2. Bank deposits-to-GDP 
ratios are included as a (wealth-controlled) liquidity measure which also acts as a proxy variable 
for investment activity. Bank concentration is included because the literature has, on occasion, 
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shown this variable to be significant, although opinion is divided about the sign of the regression 
coefficient. Beck et al. (2006) first theorise (and subsequently demonstrate) that low 
concentration is associated with crises (i.e. a negative coefficient) on the basis that higher asset 
concentration will result in monopoly-like profits being enjoyed by the main sectoral participants 
and therefore more highly-concentrated banking sectors ought to demonstrate relatively greater 
stability. By contrast, Schaeck et al. (2009) find that more competitive banking sectors are less 
likely to experience a systemic crisis (see also Allen and Gale (2003)). 
We also analyse the proportion of lending activity in an economy undertaken by non-resident 
banks. This variable is an alternative capital-flow disturbance proxy variable. We anticipate non-
resident banks as being more likely to wind up their operations during cyclical or shock-related 
downturns than local banks would be, therefore we anticipate a positive regression coefficient. 
Finally, a house price index is included because financial crises often develop in the wake of real-
estate “bubbles” where property has become overvalued and borrowers over-extended. 
According to Minsky (1986) there is a “euphoric” phase inherent in such bubbles where caution 
is thrown to the wind and long-standing bank lending rules are either relaxed or ignored. All 
Panel B variables are described in detail in Appendix 2, including their source dataset. 
4. Results 
Table 3 highlights the results achieved via the first set of regressions using Panel A. The sample 
size is comparable to the original 1998 sample (656 in our initial regression compared with 546 in 
the corresponding original) and the number of crisis episodes identical (i.e. 28). The finding that 
low GDP growth-rates are significantly associated with systemic bank crises is reconfirmed. The 
importance of real-interest rate levels to the well-being of banks is also validated in that high 
real-interest rates are significantly associated with bank crises. We also successfully replicate their 
finding that the presence of explicit deposit-insurance is associated with sectoral instability. A 
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degree of support is found for the view that high levels of the private-credit-to-GDP ratio has 
sectoral stability implications in that the coefficient is reported as statistically significant at the 
5% level in one out of two regressions. Also reconfirmed are the findings that depreciation of a 
country’s currency, its budget-deficit-to-GDP and lagged credit-growth rates do not appear to be 
significant crisis determinants. 
Where Table 3 differs markedly from the original paper is in relation to inflation and reversals of 
capital flows. Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) find that high inflation is positively 
associated with systemic banking crises at a 1% level of significance, a result which we do not 
confirm. Similar outcomes for reversals of capital flow (M2-to-foreign-exchange-reserves) and 
deteriorating terms-of-trade are observed. In neither case do we find these variables to be 
significant, at least as far as our Panel A analysis is concerned. The terms-of-trade finding is likely 
to have been influenced by our inflation result, and the others we ascribe to data replication 
differences. To compare model-fit the Akaike Information Criterion, or AIC scores, are 
considered. The AIC score is a commonly-used goodness-of-fit measure for logistic regressions. 
Those reported in Table 3 are similar to the original paper. The lower the AIC score the better 
the model-fit. In 1998 the AIC scores ranged from 204 to 131 (see Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache (1998) and Table 2), whereas Table 3 reports AIC scores in the range 196 to 101, 
representing a moderate model-fit improvement. 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) describe their method for predicting in-sample crises as 
follows: A sample threshold crisis probability is established, this being the ratio of crises to total 
observations (approx. 5%). For each regression the corresponding predicted crisis probabilities 
are determined.9 If the predicted probability exceeds the sample threshold probability the model 
is assumed to “predict” a crisis. As a result, correct as well as incorrect predictions can be 
                                                     
9 We make use of the Stata analytical package for this purpose. Predictions are made via the “Predict” command. 
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quantified. A good model should predict a high proportion of actual in-sample crises without 
over-predicting them.10 They should do so by also simultaneously correctly predicting a high 
proportion of no-crisis outcomes.  
As far as comparative crisis-prediction outcomes are concerned our results are mixed. The 
original 1998-reported total correct predictions (i.e. correct crisis as well as correct no-crisis 
predictions) are marginally higher than we achieve (reported as 74%, 77% and 79% accuracy 
rates compared with our corresponding rates of 66%, 46% and 47%). One explanation for this 
difference could be the significant inflation and capital flow coefficients as are reported in 1998, 
but which we do not reproduce. However, in terms of correctly predicting actual sample crises, 
some improvement is achieved. We correctly predict crises 68%, 70% and 81% of the time 
depending upon the specification. These compare favourably with the original paper’s 61%, 58% 
and 55% crisis-accuracy levels. As far as our overall replication efforts are concerned Table 3 
reports outcomes broadly compatible with Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache’s (1998) findings. 
Where differences exist, these are invariably resolved via subsequent analysis.  
Table 4 illustrates the results obtained by extending Panel A’s coverage to 2010. Identical 
explanatory variables to Table 3 are again assessed, this time with the dependent variable 
determined by Laeven and Valencia’s (2013) dataset. Several interesting results now emerge. Low 
GDP growth, though still significant at the 10% level, is not as significant as heretofore. A  
 
 
similar result is apparent in terms of the real-interest rate which was reported as being significant 
at up to the 1% level in Table 3 but is only significant in one out of three regressions in Table 4. 
Deposit-insurance remains significant at the 5% level. In regression three, controlling for the 
                                                     
10 This is characterised as the model consistently returning predicted crisis probabilities that are higher than the 
threshold probability coupled with low no-crisis prediction accuracy. 
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presence of deposit-insurance, we now find support for the significance of capital flow reversals, 
private-credit-to-GDP and real-GDP-per-capita as systemic crisis determinants (see Lane and 
McQuade (2014), Calvo (1998) and Bruno and Shin (2013) regarding capital flows and Beck et al. 
(2006) regarding deposit-insurance). Overall, these results are very similar to Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache’s (1998) findings, albeit being driven by an alternative dependent variable. However, 
as the summary section of Table 4 demonstrates, when measured over a thirty year time span 
these variables lose efficacy as predictors of in-sample crisis events compared with their predictive 
power over the shorter 1980-1994 period. 
Overall, how are we to interpret these results? It is possible that the factors most closely 
associated with systemic banking crises have changed relative to the period 1980-1994. Fiscal 
policy, e.g. achieving low EU inflation, might partially explain the loss of real-interest rate 
significance. It is also possible that bank operational diversification plays a role. We know banks 
compete with each other in terms of return-on-equity (ROE), this being a key performance 
indicator assessed by investors and analysts. However, with more stringent capital-adequacy 
requirements demanding banks hold more capital, achieving ROE growth is rendered 
increasingly difficult. Higher returns must be generated just to maintain ROE levels at historical 
levels in circumstances where minimum equity levels are ratcheted upwards by regulators. Yet 
Table 1 shows real-interest rates in leading economies such as the USA, the UK and Germany 
averaged at less than 3%, thus applying pressure on bank earnings derived via net-interest-margin 
(NIM) channels. Banks responded by diversifying their business activities so as to focus less 
upon NIM returns but more on complex securities-trading activities. The search for higher (or at 
the very least maintenance of) ROE requires asset and leverage growth, thus changing the risk 
profile of banks (see Brunnermeier et al. (2009) and Chapter 3). 
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Our view is that the business-cycle phase plays a fundamental determinants-establishing role in 
pooled logit models, especially whenever panels are shallow and do not span a full cycle. We 
provide evidence for this via Table 5. Here our sample is broken into three time-frames (termed 
triads), 1980-1990, 1991-2000 and 2001-2010.11 First we consider regressions 1) to 3) wherein all 
country observations are discounted after the first recorded systemic crisis, as per the usual 
approach. The significant Table 4 variables are re-assessed over each discrete triad with the 
results showing the choice of time-frame to be highly relevant. For example GDP growth-rates 
are not significant in the period 1980-1999 but are significant during the subsequent twenty 
years. By contrast real-interest rates behave in the opposite way, being initially significant but 
then demonstrating little crisis-likelihood relevance in later years. We see similar variation in all 
of our key explanatory variables. Note also that this is not a consequence of having our sample 
observations concentrated in the first triad, as regressions 4) to 6) demonstrate. Here we have 
retained all observations and do not discard those subsequent to the first recorded crisis per 
country. Naturally this results in greatly increased crisis counts. However, once again we see the 
same patterns of coefficient variation as was observed in regressions 1) to 3). Regressions 4) to 6) 
also show that explanatory variable endogeneity concerns post-crisis-onset are immaterial to the 
primary results because, with the sole exception of the terms-of-trade variable in regression 6), 
we observe the same significant variables as before and with the same coefficient sign in all other 
cases.    
Whatever the underlying reasons might be, Tables 4 and 5 indicate that macroeconomic variables 
lose efficacy as systemic banking crisis determinants measured over the medium to long-term 
and also that the choice of time-frame is fundamental in terms of results reported. In line with 
                                                     
11 Note that because all entries for a country subsequent to the first observed systemic crisis are removed from the 
panel there are considerably more observations covering the earlier years of the overall panel than there are for the 
latter years. However this approach is necessary due to crisis-onset endogeneity concerns as described above. 
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our introductory motivation we next consider whether the replacement of potentially redundant 
macroeconomic variables with financial-services sector alternatives might offset some of this loss 
of explanatory power. With this in mind such variables as terms-of-trade, currency depreciation, 
inflation and fiscal deficit are no longer considered, primarily because they demonstrate either 
weak or else inconsistent systemic crisis explanatory power. They are replaced with sectoral 
variables not yet considered and include the capital-to-asset ratio (CAR) and a house price index. 
The results are presented in Table 6 and should be contrasted with those of Tables 3 and 4. As 
before the GDP growth rate, private-credit-to-GDP rate, real-interest rate and exposure to 
capital flow reversals remain among the most significant variables. However neither the leverage 
ratio nor the deposit-insurance variable is significant. Real-estate price increases are significantly 
negatively associated with crises, contrary to expectations. This may illustrate that real-estate 
price growth is more reflective of the benefits of increased economic activity rather than as a 
signal of possible property bubbles and/or troubled banking sectors. 
The regressions represent a better fit to our data than those of Table 4 with their redundant 
macroeconomic factors. The AIC scores are significantly lower, so that the improvement in 
terms of total correct crisis (as well as no-crisis) predictions is not surprising. These range from 
73% to 81% in terms of overall correct predictions, representing a marked improvement upon 
the 38% to 55% achieved in Table 4. We conclude that more appropriately constituted samples, 
combining macroeconomic and sectoral variables, are better suited for predicting in- 
  
  
[19] 
 
sample crises. However our findings need to be set in a proper context. The number of 
observations and crisis episodes in Table 6 is significantly smaller than in Table 4 due to the 
dearth of capital-to-asset adequacy ratio and house price index data. This motivates the creation 
of our second panel, i.e. Panel B, and so we now turn to analysing sectoral data in more detail. 
The data comprising Panel B data has been extracted (almost) exclusively from bank Balance 
sheets, enabling us to analyse sectoral-centric models in the absence of any macroeconomic 
controls. In turn we contrast the performance of such sector-centric models with their 
macroeconomic-centric counterparts, over the period 1998-2011. Several new explanatory 
variables are introduced, the rationale for which was described in section 4 above. 
The results are presented in Table 7. Bank Z-score is significantly negative in all regressions as 
expected, highlighting the importance of earnings and capital / reserves to bank stability. Private-
credit-to-GDP rates are also significant, showing that the level of indebtedness of a country 
relative to its income contributes strongly to the likelihood of a systemic banking crisis. The 
bank-credit-to-deposit ratio also takes on the expected sign, i.e. the more multiples of deposit 
units invested the higher the risk exposure of banks, however this is only significant at the 5% 
level in one out of five regressions. This result, coupled with the more-significant non-
performing-loan coefficient, exposes the importance of loan quality from a systemic stability 
perspective. 
Neither the deposits-to-total-assets variable nor the net-interest-margin is significant. So far all of 
our asset-dependent ratios, including the capital-to-assets ratio of Table 4, have invariably been 
reported as insignificant from a systemic crisis perspective. This is surprising, given our 
knowledge of the GFC being associated with a downwards liquidity spiral which in turn reflected 
institutional investors’/depositors’ concerns over rapidly-declining asset values and associated  
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credit risk increases (see Brunnermeier (2008)). The GFC patently demonstrates the extent to 
which banks were exposed to a large asset-valuation shock, however if those assets are not 
comprehensively reported on bank Balance sheets the fact that the GFC was not signalled well in 
advance is perhaps not so surprising after all. Our findings show the importance of maintaining 
all assets “on” rather than “off” Balance sheet, or at least that all assets must be subjected to the 
same degree of regulatory control and are not germane only to the “on” Balance sheet items. 
Our concern is reinforced when one considers that one of the most important macro-prudential 
measures, i.e. Tier-1 Capital, has risk-weighted assets as its denominator yet this measure also 
does not show up as being a significant systemic crisis determinant (see Chapter 2). 
Whereas Table 6 demonstrates how sudden capital flow reversals may be associated with bank 
instability, this result is not driven by the departure of non-resident banks in troubled times, as 
the Table 7 coefficient for non-resident-bank-loans-to-GDP variable illustrates. Bruno and Shin 
(2013) argue that it was a capital flow disturbance, resulting from a lending maturity mismatch 
where banks borrowed internationally but lent domestically, which was a major GFC 
contributory factor. Our result provides further evidence of that. We also note that bank 
concentration is not significant in any sectoral-centric regression, contrary to Beck et al.’s (2006) 
findings which are based primarily on macroeconomic variables (see also Eichler and Sobański 
(2012)). The model-fit results reported in Table 7 should be contrasted with those reported in 
Table 3. The AIC score is lower in regression 3 of Table 3 but higher in regressions 1 and 2 than 
any AIC score reported in Table 7. We conclude that sectoral variables fit the data at least as well 
as their macroeconomic counterparts. The corresponding p-values, highlighting the joint 
significance of all variables in our Table 7 regressions also support this contention. 
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As far as in-sample predictive power is concerned the results are mixed. In Table 7 the total 
correct prediction rate ranges from 37%-63% whereas in Table 3 the range is 46%-67%. 
Accurate crisis predictions range from 80%-89% versus 68%-81% in Table 3, representing a 
significant improvement. This is offset by the relative deterioration of correct no-crisis 
predictions, especially when we control for non-performing loans and non-resident-loans-to-
total-loans, where Table 3 performs considerably better. One might argue that logit regressions 
involving exclusively Balance sheet data over-predict crises, however one could also argue that 
the higher crisis likelihoods reported using sectoral-centric variables represent a better alignment 
between systemic banking crises and their underlying sectoral variables than is the case when 
macroeconomic variables are employed.  
Our final objective is to develop a cluster of control variables for use in future research and for 
assessing the appropriateness of different systemic risk index measures currently under 
development (see Acharya et al. (2010) and Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011)). We present these 
results in Table 8. The first specification contains only sectoral variables, all of which are 
significant, including Bank Z-Score, bank-credit-to-deposit ratio, non-performing loan levels and 
net-interest-margins. These four factors jointly capture several aspects of systemic bank risk 
exposure. The second column details those traditional macroeconomic factors invariably 
reported in the literature as systemic crisis determinants. These include GDP growth-rate, real-
interest rate and inflation. As before, when considered in isolation, all the coefficients are 
significant. 
Combining both sets of variables, as per regression 3), we find that Bank Z-Score is the only 
variable to lose its significance. The higher log likelihood and lower AIC scores of regressions 1 
and 3, relative to regression 2, illustrate that sectoral variables represent a better data fit than do 
macroeconomic-centric models. They are also relatively more successful at predicting crises 
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although this is at the expense of predicting crises in years when none in fact were recorded. As 
always regulatory authorities must weigh the cost associated with overlooking a crisis versus the 
cost of taking remedial action when none in fact is warranted. 
5. Robustness Checks 
The results relating to the various pooled logit regressions are presented in Tables 3 thru 8, with 
detailed Panel A and B descriptions described in the appendices.  We present alternatives to 
pooled logit specifications in Table 9 for comparison purposes. Whereas pooled logit has been 
the most common method used to identify determinants in the past the technique has been 
criticised for its inherent assumption that all countries have the same relationship between 
systemic crises and the vector of explanatory variables over the panel’s time-period. A fixed-
effects (FE) model (see Table 9 regression 2) can be adopted to capture inter-country differences 
via the intercept coefficient (the regression constant). However the use of fixed-effects 
estimation vis-à-vis systemic crisis determinants is not preferred because no time-invariant 
factors can be included. Therefore countries without any crisis during our sample period must be 
omitted due to model collinearity between the dependent variable (all zeroes for a non-crisis 
country) and the dummy variable identifying the country (all ones for that country). This 
restriction results in greatly reduced sample sizes (from 387 to 154) and leaves the analysis absent 
any non-crisis country controls, which is also not preferred. Interestingly the fixed effects 
specification identifies the same determinants with the same signs as the pooled logit 
specification, thus increasing our confidence in the pooled logit alternative. We conclude that 
little is gained as a result of adopting fixed effects specifications which have the considerable 
disadvantages of yielding reduced sample sizes as well resulting in over-predicting models (the 
FE specification only correctly anticipates 1% of non-crisis outcomes). Another alternative is to 
use a random-effects (RE) specification (see Table 9 regression 3), whereby an assumption is 
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made that the individual specific differences across countries are not correlated with the 
explanatory variables. This overcomes the difficulty of greatly reduced sample sizes but it is a 
strong assumption to make. We see that the random-effects estimates are essentially identical to 
their pooled counterparts, increasing confidence in the earlier estimates, i.e. those achieved 
without having to make the strong assumption described. 
Using a software enhancement (see Conniffe and O’Neill (2009)) we re-estimate the models 
whereby missing values are inferred from the distribution parameters of the available data. Doing 
so does not materially alter the primary results thus reducing any concerns that missing values, as 
are occasionally reported in Table 2, may be yielding inaccurate outcomes. A final robustness 
check involves the removal of crisis episodes via the elimination of countries from the panel. 
The purpose of this check is to ensure that our results are not driven by factors peculiar to any 
individual country. Starting with regression 5 of Table 7 as the benchmark, the data for the 
United Kingdom, United States, Germany, Sweden and Russia are removed one at a time (non-
cumulatively) and the model re-estimated each time. Every country removed will have 
experienced at least one systemic crisis. The results are reported in Table 10. It can be seen that 
in all cases the most significant variables retain their sign and significance, with only small 
differences reported in coefficient estimates, statistical significance and crisis prediction statistics. 
6. Conclusions 
This paper utilises several newly-released data sources and examines the determinants of 
systemic banking crises in circumstances where the explanatory data has been drawn primarily 
from financial-services (aggregate bank Balance sheet) datasets over a time-frame that spans the 
Global Financial Crisis. The results are compared and contrasted with those attained in earlier 
papers where explanatory variables are drawn principally from well-known sources such as the 
MF / World Bank. Having replicated the results of the first paper to examine systemic bank 
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crisis determinants (see Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998)) we go on to show how these 
determinants behave when considered over a full business cycle. Tables 3, 4 and 5 show that 
whereas macroeconomic variables perform well as crisis determinants over a short period (up to 
15 years) they lose explanatory power when measured over a longer time span (30 years). If only 
shallow panels are available, researchers must take the current business cycle phase into account 
when reporting results (see Table 5). 
We show that short-run models encompassing such sectoral variables as leverage ratio, deposit-
insurance and real-estate prices perform at least equally as well in terms of crisis-prediction as 
their earlier macroeconomic-centric counterparts. In fact we show that models containing 
explanatory variables drawn exclusively from bank Balance sheet data (see Table 7) over the 
period 1998-2011 are equally as informative as were macroeconomic variables in terms of 
explaining systemic crises over the period 1980-1994. However several important sectoral 
variables such as Bank Z-scores and non-performing loan levels are not generally available pre-
1998, therefore a long-run comparison of macroeconomic versus sectoral models must wait until 
deeper sectoral panels become available. Nevertheless, given the importance of asset-values to 
each of these measures it is important that all bank assets (i.e. “off” as well as “on” balance 
sheet) should be subject to regulatory control. 
Finally, we present a control cluster of key sectoral and macroeconomic variables which may be 
used in future systemic banking crisis research, particularly in matters of bank stress-testing, 
systemic risk model calibration and in the assessment of regulatory effectiveness. 
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Demirgüç-Kunt & 
Detragiache (1998)
Laeven & Valencia 
(2013) 
Deposit 
Insurance
Country Crisis Year(s) Crisis Year(s) Avg Min Max Avg Min Max Avg Min Max Avg Min Max Avg Min Max Avg Min Max
Australia - - - 3.32 -1.06 6.28 3.70 -0.95 10.23 4.72 0.36 12.09 19.64 7.71 51.94 65.59 24.36 123.97 12.40 0.00 37.81
Austria - 2008-2010 1980 2.24 -3.81 5.46 2.66 -0.57 5.69 2.48 0.01 6.63 62.13 25.86 107.72 92.50 64.24 123.83 3.07 -100.00 10.92
Bahrain - - 1993 5.17 -2.75 12.88 2.03 -10.27 24.58 2.23 -17.38 14.35 3.09 0.78 5.36 53.38 28.05 133.37 -38.15 -1344.63 261.32
Belgium - 2008-2010 1980 2.74 -2.75 27.18 4.02 -1.71 19.33 2.32 -16.61 7.57 55.01 42.92 68.21 58.95 25.78 136.85 5.75 -100.00 118.67
Burundi - 1994-1998 - 2.16 -8.61 10.91 -1.32 -52.07 17.47 11.07 -6.17 59.99 3.49 0.99 13.10 14.86 6.57 28.68 17.48 -18.84 84.35
Canada - - 1980 2.58 -2.86 5.81 1.45 -2.24 5.16 3.47 -1.95 10.78 53.17 18.25 146.26 104.62 66.29 182.58 6.96 -100.00 81.52
Colombia 1982-1985 1982, 1998-2000 1986 3.51 -4.20 6.90 1.83 -0.46 2.39 18.48 3.41 52.34 3.61 1.86 9.15 28.12 20.86 40.39 16.19 -100.00 99.29
Congo, Rep. - 1992-1994 2007 4.38 -6.88 23.57 3.90 -39.46 40.19 8.02 -29.19 46.46 2129.73 0.55 62234.97 11.46 2.04 31.72 -21.29 -1078.22 196.44
Cyprus - - 2000 4.73 -1.86 9.92 0.67 -6.29 3.75 4.96 0.09 13.99 10.21 4.42 18.84 149.74 59.98 272.92 15.18 0.00 59.31
Denmark - 2008-2010 1988 1.56 -5.67 5.53 4.12 -3.44 10.83 3.90 0.66 11.78 7.70 3.79 12.66 70.24 22.06 208.14 12.71 -6.85 164.91
Ecuador - 1982-1986,1998-2002 - 3.10 -5.98 10.49 22.01 -11.51 87.77 4.14 -31.52 24.70 4.69 1.60 14.44 23.10 12.93 40.67 10.25 -31.87 136.87
Egypt, Arab Rep. - 1980 - 5.47 1.11 10.01 0.18 -8.44 8.13 10.09 0.87 18.84 17.96 3.00 63.94 37.66 17.82 60.41 16.08 -7.15 51.46
El Salvador - 1989-1990 1999 2.58 -8.67 21.26 6.89 -0.94 18.11 8.10 -1.32 37.04 4.07 1.26 6.32 5.52 2.08 10.80 8.70 -45.13 40.01
Finland 1991-1994 1991-1994 1980 2.55 -8.54 6.67 3.58 -0.31 11.81 3.86 -0.69 10.91 9.21 0.97 42.82 65.26 42.04 93.28 9.38 -8.83 24.65
France - 2008-2010 1980 1.91 -3.05 4.75 3.08 -1.30 8.51 3.61 -1.47 11.73 80.10 54.52 105.06 90.94 72.76 111.40 3.81 -100.00 16.13
Germany - 2008-2010 1980 2.10 -5.07 13.22 2.49 -0.55 5.79 2.06 -0.67 5.89 113.86 84.38 131.13 99.52 75.32 117.54 5.21 -1.97 15.21
Greece - 2008-2010 1993 1.78 -4.94 5.95 0.33 -11.96 7.70 11.65 0.90 27.21 706.17 24.71 2363.45 48.14 27.14 105.92 16.56 0.00 43.04
Guatemala - - 1999 2.88 -3.54 6.30 1.14 -32.46 14.66 10.57 -4.08 41.46 5.36 2.40 19.98 18.44 11.25 26.38 17.57 -20.65 76.37
Guyana 1993-1995 1993 - 1.24 -11.50 8.48 -9.81 -147.42 14.44 23.00 -0.63 162.61 22.61 1.27 129.08 37.76 16.68 60.58 -23.73 -579.49 192.95
Honduras - - 1999 3.30 -2.13 6.57 11.37 -3.27 21.17 11.18 2.83 30.82 9.10 2.10 83.55 33.24 22.79 52.47 17.48 -14.15 123.18
India 1991-1994 1993 1980 5.69 -5.25 9.57 1.06 -15.11 9.26 8.39 3.26 24.84 15.94 3.21 115.22 28.79 21.63 44.67 16.70 0.00 29.01
Indonesia 1992-1994 1997-2001 1998 5.13 -13.13 9.88 0.63 -16.28 21.61 14.11 5.12 75.27 4.47 2.21 7.51 27.72 9.05 53.53 30.02 -56.66 313.72
Ireland - 2008-2010 - 4.57 -5.46 11.57 2.90 -2.43 12.30 4.89 -4.64 17.44 150.88 4.28 957.64 86.76 42.83 237.15 16.60 -7.03 87.47
Israel 1983-1984 - - 4.69 -0.18 24.00 -0.75 -167.45 158.77 46.61 -0.58 384.75 5.55 1.30 11.35 64.54 41.35 96.76 127.14 -455.54 3554.18
Italy 1990-1994 2008-2010 1987 1.70 -5.50 5.53 2.28 -8.84 9.76 6.43 0.38 21.35 23.85 0.01 72.99 65.54 47.56 115.22 9.69 0.00 20.93
Jamaica - 1996-1998 1998 1.12 -14.08 17.09 0.14 -52.45 18.98 19.39 -3.58 86.81 9.76 3.17 34.45 22.36 13.09 30.66 21.33 -15.65 118.79
Japan 1992-1994 1997-2001 1980 2.34 -5.53 7.26 1.60 -0.22 3.99 0.42 -2.16 5.77 56.09 9.34 117.11 175.71 121.88 228.03 3.73 -13.96 13.21
Jordan 1989-1990 1989-1991 2000 5.09 -10.73 20.80 0.54 -14.41 6.62 5.43 -0.41 19.35 7.24 2.24 67.78 67.06 41.58 84.98 12.66 -12.86 49.43
Kenya 1993 1985, 1992-1994 1985 5.66 -0.80 52.55 3.65 -18.86 30.01 8.98 -27.19 41.86 9.21 3.46 84.68 29.09 25.25 34.96 16.83 -22.45 84.87
Korea, Rep. - 1987-1988 1996 6.18 -6.85 11.10 3.38 -4.74 8.63 6.52 -1.04 23.60 6.36 2.28 13.73 67.70 38.28 104.68 16.62 0.00 42.71
TABLE 1
GDP Growth Rate Real Interest Rate Inflation M2 Money to Forex Reserves Private Credit to GDP Ratio Private Credit Growth Rate
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Demirgüç-Kunt & 
Detragiache (1998)
Laeven & Valencia 
(2013) 
Deposit 
Insurance
Country Crisis Year(s) Crisis Year(s) Avg Min Max Avg Min Max Avg Min Max Avg Min Max Avg Min Max Avg Min Max
Malaysia 1985-1988 1997-1999 2007 6.11 -7.36 10.00 0.59 -7.00 12.76 3.80 -8.64 12.06 4.66 2.40 9.99 95.72 36.38 155.17 13.78 -39.21 72.22
Mali 1987-1989 1987-1991 - 3.60 -7.23 15.16 4.17 -33.10 62.09 3.57 -57.14 38.05 20.90 1.44 233.96 15.20 4.30 29.27 6.94 -44.40 47.97
Mexico 1982, 1994 1981-1985, 1994-1996 1986 2.83 -6.17 9.16 -2.33 -43.25 18.47 30.75 4.01 140.98 9.18 2.82 69.77 17.80 8.69 33.32 -9.23 -885.95 542.13
Nepal 1988-1994 1988 - 4.17 -2.98 9.68 -3.39 -9.56 4.39 9.23 3.07 18.46 3.93 1.99 14.24 19.50 5.51 51.13 19.03 -6.77 48.65
Netherlands - 2008-2010 1980 2.17 -3.66 4.70 3.18 -1.32 9.89 2.37 -0.26 6.50 56.04 3.88 166.26 105.96 58.17 209.45 4.02 -100.00 25.03
New Zealand - - - 2.66 -3.28 8.47 4.29 -5.19 17.07 5.32 0.24 19.40 9.89 2.50 19.55 77.90 16.95 147.47 15.22 -3.43 152.84
Niger - 1983-1985 - 1.97 -16.83 10.42 3.85 -12.37 21.68 4.77 -5.90 20.82 2.98 1.28 17.25 10.60 3.54 18.25 8.03 -15.93 118.57
Nigeria 1991-1994 1991-1995, 2009-2010 1988 3.68 -8.39 10.60 -7.11 -99.06 23.82 21.49 -6.29 111.56 5.92 0.65 27.29 14.30 8.38 35.39 48.84 -50.29 442.31
Norway 1987-1993 1991-1993 1980 2.69 -1.64 5.89 2.97 -8.93 14.82 4.93 -5.39 15.65 4.28 2.60 7.25 69.75 48.57 87.61 6.12 -100.00 29.67
Papua New Guinea 1989-1994 - - 3.16 -6.34 18.21 4.74 -3.85 15.89 6.48 -4.27 28.94 3.67 1.48 17.17 19.31 10.52 29.43 12.04 -14.19 54.50
Paraguay - 1995 2003 3.52 -3.84 15.05 -0.36 -15.09 10.16 15.85 -0.12 47.25 2.52 1.32 4.52 20.37 11.75 32.30 24.01 -30.83 123.55
Philippines 1981-1987 1983-1986, 1997-2001 1980 3.30 -7.32 7.63 2.82 -24.81 13.13 9.83 2.77 53.34 6.36 2.27 17.48 32.68 17.01 55.60 16.86 -43.46 136.26
Portugal 1986-1989 2008-2010 1992 2.38 -2.91 8.45 0.35 -9.14 7.73 9.16 0.91 26.17 106.85 19.84 337.82 95.25 47.99 186.46 14.95 0.00 39.37
Senegal 1983-1988 1988-1991 - 3.37 -4.00 15.35 1.74 -25.21 15.43 5.10 -6.71 30.76 91.47 2.00 794.38 23.96 14.52 36.44 7.31 -29.12 42.54
Seychelles - - - 3.40 -6.64 14.96 5.15 -16.95 18.50 6.54 -4.89 34.62 10.48 2.64 25.30 18.06 8.51 30.11 13.50 -17.27 63.92
Singapore - - 2007 7.02 -1.62 14.76 -0.08 -6.40 4.11 2.29 -2.68 11.45 1.20 1.01 1.37 96.97 67.77 120.37 13.38 -17.22 100.49
South Africa 1985 - - 2.48 -2.14 6.62 -0.02 -20.27 8.82 11.43 4.78 24.92 51.17 7.09 242.10 97.80 48.82 149.78 11.70 -100.00 49.92
Sri Lanka 1989-1993 1989-1990 1987 4.96 -1.55 8.02 2.30 -9.02 12.77 11.08 0.62 20.80 4.40 1.92 9.92 21.67 8.26 30.57 17.87 -14.99 69.63
Swaziland - 1995-1999 - 4.18 -4.41 14.63 -0.91 -33.74 12.50 10.93 -1.00 44.87 1.42 0.88 2.36 17.54 10.92 24.57 29.00 -70.47 483.52
Sweden 1990-1993 1991-1995, 2008-2010 1996 2.28 -5.03 6.56 2.53 -9.59 11.86 4.46 0.31 16.39 11.57 4.19 24.29 94.69 67.54 124.47 11.01 -5.37 124.51
Switzerland - 2008-2010 1984 1.80 -1.94 4.40 0.26 -12.92 5.63 2.45 -0.45 13.93 9.70 3.91 16.31 144.58 98.37 165.05 5.47 -0.48 18.72
Syrian Arab Republic - - - 4.45 -8.96 13.47 -3.64 -17.82 7.78 10.33 -2.78 28.61 56.43 5.65 247.18 8.83 1.45 20.43 15.47 -19.31 46.05
Tanzania 1988-1994 1987-1988 1994 5.05 0.58 7.83 -0.97 -33.20 13.47 17.34 5.28 47.70 41.61 1.27 555.00 5.31 0.46 14.64 22.21 -9.66 78.57
Thailand - 1983, 1997-2000 1997 5.60 -10.51 13.29 2.40 -5.73 11.63 4.24 -4.04 13.13 5.88 2.23 13.70 89.84 39.43 165.80 12.26 -10.65 28.11
Togo - 1993-1994 - 2.25 -15.10 14.98 3.55 -29.74 12.35 5.33 -6.44 34.69 2.43 1.08 5.93 20.04 6.33 29.96 8.98 -28.22 99.18
Uganda 1990-1994 1994 1994 9.74 -13.62 60.22 -17.04 -193.01 37.32 36.29 -11.90 223.51 35.30 0.96 825.28 4.83 1.21 12.01 26.31 -166.64 157.81
United Kingdom - 2007-2010 1982 2.25 -3.97 5.03 2.71 -6.54 6.92 4.72 0.67 19.54 42.48 7.24 111.93 108.28 23.01 213.66 13.71 0.00 71.98
United States 1981-1992 2007-2010 1980 2.66 -3.07 7.19 2.13 -1.44 5.82 3.23 0.87 9.37 216.41 81.37 471.34 139.85 90.49 202.75 6.89 -0.12 13.98
Uruguay 1981-1985 1981-1985, 2002-2005 - 2.53 -9.39 8.90 41.05 -9.85 144.55 37.37 0.68 107.05 8.99 1.62 51.09 31.21 19.99 60.65 -231.56 -8520.12 277.90
Venezuela, RB 1993-1994 1994-1998 1985 2.08 -8.86 18.29 -12.84 -98.82 23.96 30.54 1.44 115.52 3.18 1.25 13.56 18.74 8.13 30.66 27.65 -589.17 760.33
Zambia - 1995-1998 - 2.49 -3.51 7.62 -0.87 -41.79 25.12 39.66 6.14 165.52 7.85 1.66 33.41 9.59 3.69 24.18 3.67 -372.00 401.09
Summary Statistics:
Average 3.48 -5.61 12.34 1.98 -24.28 20.13 10.52 -3.78 46.06 72.94 7.99 1172.09 53.94 29.84 90.48 9.48 -254.87 178.20
Std. Deviation 1.73 4.14 9.79 8.83 38.82 25.73 11.28 10.91 52.32 44.33 14.51 228.27 44.05 27.33 68.77 45.30 1525.51 182.21
Max Crises 29 57
Max Countries 61 61
Max Observations 854 1830
Panel 1 presents summary statistics of key variables used in the original Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) study. The data driving the two alternatives for the dependant variable are shown in cols 2 and 3 with the Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) crises listed in column 2 
and the Laeven and Valencia (2013) crises shown in column 3.  The variables shown became central to future research and invariably show up as being significantly associated with crisis likelihood. These include GDP growth rates, real interest rates, inflation and money to foreign 
exchange reserves. Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) also included two sectoral variables, these are the ratio of total lending (credit extended) to GDP as well as total lending growth rates.
TABLE 1 (Continued)
GDP Growth Rate Real Interest Rate Inflation M2 Money to Forex Reserves 
Private Credit to GDP 
Ratio
Private Credit Growth Rate
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Laeven & Valencia 
(2013) 
Country Crisis Year(s) Avg Min Max Avg Min Max Avg Min Max Avg Min Max Avg Min Max Avg Min Max Avg Min Max
Argentina 2001-2003 12.25 10.60 13.50 4.12 0.43 5.45 68.67 44.52 97.75 77.54 68.30 93.82 7.84 1.20 18.10 14.16 0.00 20.80 3.64 -0.73 8.81
Australia 5.88 5.00 7.60 11.18 4.45 14.68 133.07 124.72 144.23 97.00 94.37 98.50 0.90 0.20 2.20 10.54 9.60 11.90 2.02 0.59 4.30
Austria 2008-2011 5.67 4.70 7.50 24.44 17.97 40.86 116.19 0.00 130.01 99.28 98.90 99.56 2.51 1.70 3.00 13.61 11.80 15.80 1.61 0.81 2.18
Bahrain - - - 18.92 14.84 25.99 79.54 64.36 98.65 96.92 94.41 99.24 - - - 13.51 11.55 16.54 1.86 1.58 2.35
Belgium 2008-2011 3.60 2.70 5.00 5.83 2.56 7.74 80.20 0.00 94.58 99.54 98.98 99.78 2.44 1.40 3.00 13.83 11.20 19.30 1.26 0.93 2.16
Brazil 1998 10.56 8.90 12.10 18.67 15.49 20.20 71.04 59.16 87.22 82.40 76.30 85.73 4.87 2.90 10.20 17.26 13.80 19.00 6.38 3.44 8.00
Bulgaria 11.26 7.30 15.30 19.14 14.16 28.11 62.49 0.00 129.21 83.54 63.50 99.85 7.49 2.00 26.70 22.82 13.80 41.80 4.91 3.97 5.77
Burundi 1998 - - - 18.27 13.78 21.48 102.36 66.85 143.95 63.00 51.43 70.09 - - - - - - 8.83 4.50 13.78
Canada 4.53 3.50 5.60 20.60 14.63 25.60 74.69 0.00 113.95 97.37 96.41 98.28 1.00 0.40 1.60 13.36 10.60 15.90 2.08 1.12 3.87
Colombia 1998-2000 12.32 9.40 14.30 7.05 4.50 8.58 153.64 92.70 200.95 97.64 94.70 99.50 6.12 2.50 13.60 14.43 10.30 17.30 5.13 3.70 6.49
Congo, Rep. - - - 0.00 0.00 0.00 55.06 21.07 152.63 55.82 33.18 96.18 - - - - - - 2.72 1.45 3.49
Croatia 1998-1999 12.05 8.60 18.30 38.22 30.32 46.74 97.53 71.55 110.08 99.92 99.58 99.99 8.23 4.80 12.30 17.00 12.70 21.30 3.80 3.20 4.42
Cyprus 6.15 4.90 6.90 3.89 -0.74 7.81 101.21 92.63 121.57 94.68 92.36 97.52 5.23 3.60 7.20 10.73 5.40 12.84 2.83 -0.23 5.67
Czech Republic 1998-2000 5.75 5.20 6.50 7.98 4.21 9.77 55.84 0.00 108.39 97.26 95.12 99.65 9.34 2.70 29.30 13.56 11.40 17.40 3.04 2.52 3.88
Denmark 2008-2011 5.55 4.20 6.30 15.52 10.34 18.80 203.46 0.00 313.33 98.98 96.52 99.90 1.52 0.20 4.10 12.78 9.27 17.00 1.41 1.08 1.89
Ecuador 1998-2002 9.80 8.10 14.50 -1.40 -6.68 2.90 114.52 89.57 237.35 89.15 76.76 99.60 9.19 3.20 31.00 14.47 8.14 19.80 3.60 -6.45 7.08
Egypt, Arab Rep. 5.39 4.80 6.20 35.76 30.96 40.32 63.98 48.06 81.94 73.95 62.72 82.14 17.94 11.00 26.50 12.50 7.55 16.40 1.72 1.23 2.43
El Salvador 10.97 6.90 13.90 21.61 14.85 31.04 99.35 88.86 109.16 90.38 88.26 92.07 2.98 1.90 4.30 14.08 11.50 17.50 5.87 2.47 10.38
Estonia 10.77 8.20 16.20 7.68 3.77 10.24 163.01 125.64 206.01 99.90 99.75 99.98 1.74 0.20 5.40 15.83 11.50 22.30 3.19 2.05 5.25
Finland 7.06 4.40 10.90 17.86 10.05 29.84 137.11 107.42 158.39 99.74 99.10 99.99 0.55 0.20 1.20 14.23 10.50 19.10 1.16 0.28 2.00
France 2008-2011 5.32 3.70 6.80 16.75 9.71 21.45 127.54 0.00 149.70 99.49 98.39 99.77 4.19 2.70 6.30 12.02 10.20 15.81 0.87 0.41 1.17
Germany 2008-2011 4.26 4.00 4.80 12.23 7.18 16.67 115.29 90.04 178.87 99.84 99.58 99.87 4.12 2.70 5.20 13.04 11.40 16.40 1.05 0.78 1.34
Guatemala 9.23 8.20 10.50 16.23 9.81 20.95 83.61 59.62 134.07 78.60 68.88 87.01 4.05 1.60 8.10 11.47 0.00 15.90 6.83 5.53 7.73
Guyana - - - 16.38 14.09 19.68 59.74 48.35 80.16 68.58 51.37 83.43 - - - 3.14 0.00 12.12 4.79 4.11 5.94
Honduras 10.24 8.80 11.20 29.83 27.75 33.49 99.06 90.21 111.24 89.69 84.84 96.99 6.19 2.90 11.20 8.39 0.00 15.30 7.63 6.34 10.02
Hungary 2008-2011 9.09 8.20 10.00 14.91 11.27 18.00 80.32 0.00 143.02 87.41 55.43 99.18 4.50 1.80 13.30 13.10 10.40 16.50 4.22 3.31 5.20
India 6.32 5.30 7.30 31.58 24.46 37.70 68.40 59.93 76.42 92.18 80.37 97.47 7.19 2.30 14.70 12.45 11.10 14.20 3.26 2.72 3.72
Indonesia 1998-2001 9.57 6.00 11.40 0.60 -7.31 1.88 62.68 38.64 95.86 78.99 67.24 93.69 15.16 2.20 48.60 19.08 16.10 22.30 4.16 -3.86 6.64
Ireland 2008-2011 5.56 4.40 7.30 3.13 0.45 7.34 169.10 120.29 222.69 99.81 99.31 100.00 3.14 0.70 14.70 12.43 10.60 19.20 0.71 0.18 1.26
Israel 5.99 4.90 7.30 24.29 20.78 27.34 100.69 93.76 107.88 98.03 96.76 99.50 3.66 1.40 9.90 10.95 9.20 14.30 2.30 1.40 3.02
Italy 2008-2011 7.44 6.40 9.40 12.53 8.15 28.14 149.79 134.42 167.44 95.35 91.20 97.06 7.88 5.30 11.80 11.03 10.10 12.80 1.94 1.35 3.45
Jamaica 1998 - - - 3.46 0.00 11.62 59.00 30.73 76.57 77.65 68.17 84.77 11.00 11.00 11.00 10.62 0.00 26.63 8.35 6.31 11.78
Japan 1998-2001 4.21 2.40 5.30 10.26 5.99 13.42 59.46 47.29 89.59 91.53 88.77 95.70 3.80 1.40 8.40 11.87 9.40 13.80 1.24 1.01 1.49
Jordan 8.76 6.20 11.30 36.69 23.26 52.90 78.18 68.33 88.26 91.61 86.97 95.80 10.62 4.10 19.30 19.03 15.90 21.70 2.99 2.10 3.47
Kenya 11.99 8.90 13.20 12.11 8.74 16.38 78.60 72.60 88.16 91.46 86.21 96.13 19.05 4.40 34.90 14.46 0.00 20.80 7.71 5.50 10.49
Korea, Rep. 6.39 2.80 9.30 5.37 1.29 9.24 137.01 115.69 168.46 98.56 95.81 99.39 3.09 0.70 8.90 12.07 8.20 14.60 2.35 0.51 4.98
Kuwait 11.66 10.30 13.00 16.66 12.44 19.42 88.09 66.62 112.61 99.80 99.51 100.00 8.58 3.80 19.20 19.82 15.60 23.70 2.80 2.24 3.60
Latvia 2008-2011 7.21 2.00 9.10 3.35 0.32 4.08 128.29 0.00 278.41 95.66 89.38 98.52 5.89 0.50 19.00 13.42 10.10 17.40 3.36 1.26 6.49
Lithuania 9.62 7.60 13.90 6.23 1.46 8.97 89.79 0.00 197.41 99.58 96.25 99.98 8.39 0.60 19.70 14.45 10.30 23.80 3.42 1.45 6.28
Mali - - - 18.33 10.97 29.37 102.70 86.52 119.73 84.71 71.41 97.28 - - - - - - 5.65 2.13 6.88
Mexico 9.69 8.00 11.40 25.87 18.67 33.79 69.82 56.99 81.26 - - - 4.00 1.50 11.30 15.21 13.80 16.90 5.78 2.04 13.19
TABLE 2
CAR Bank Z-Score Credit to Deposits Deposits to Total Assets Non-performing Loan % Tier 1 Capital Ratio Net Interest Margin
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Laeven & Valencia 
(2013) 
Country Crisis Year(s) Avg Min Max Avg Min Max Avg Min Max Avg Min Max Avg Min Max Avg Min Max Avg Min Max
Nepal - - - 3.65 -6.17 10.22 75.68 64.51 88.69 90.95 81.95 95.81 - - - 5.67 -1.40 10.27 3.90 3.18 4.82
Netherlands 2008-2011 4.22 3.00 5.10 9.31 2.36 26.25 138.48 0.00 159.38 99.86 99.66 99.95 2.34 1.50 3.20 12.35 10.70 14.90 0.98 0.26 1.73
New Zealand - - - 17.80 6.35 26.25 137.36 0.00 162.03 97.80 96.84 98.26 - - - 4.33 0.00 10.23 2.00 1.46 2.80
Niger - - - 18.05 12.50 21.94 92.33 76.49 119.36 62.09 45.60 83.14 - - - 6.54 0.00 14.70 4.83 2.53 7.14
Nigeria 2009-2011 10.70 3.20 18.50 3.10 -4.51 5.18 90.03 69.53 104.66 77.83 48.13 96.52 18.82 7.20 36.10 14.27 0.00 23.40 7.55 4.92 10.47
Norway 6.66 5.90 7.60 23.91 18.70 27.36 93.88 0.00 160.37 99.13 98.18 99.98 1.21 0.50 2.00 12.32 11.20 14.20 1.82 1.28 2.49
Papua New Guinea - - - 5.52 0.00 9.66 54.27 44.77 64.41 91.31 67.54 97.42 - - - - - - 6.64 3.74 9.25
Paraguay 10.74 8.50 14.90 12.34 8.98 15.01 113.49 84.94 150.36 80.13 69.74 93.38 7.83 1.10 20.60 15.33 0.00 20.90 8.86 7.68 10.55
Peru 9.38 8.30 10.20 12.08 9.83 13.72 87.42 75.59 105.51 99.64 98.78 100.00 6.13 2.20 14.80 12.69 11.20 14.00 6.44 4.97 9.76
Philippines 1998-2001 12.53 10.60 14.50 29.89 19.53 47.49 61.96 49.93 87.20 91.23 86.53 95.18 11.64 3.30 27.70 16.88 15.50 18.40 4.00 1.00 5.92
Portugal 2008-2011 6.06 5.50 6.60 16.43 11.51 26.05 151.13 112.75 169.77 99.80 99.38 99.95 3.20 1.50 6.90 10.36 9.20 12.50 1.76 1.01 2.51
Romania 10.29 8.60 12.90 4.91 -1.96 7.86 81.56 36.17 130.63 94.84 79.51 100.00 6.54 1.40 14.10 19.10 13.40 28.80 7.37 3.76 13.58
Russian Federation 2008-2011 12.77 7.30 15.70 8.14 2.00 12.76 105.48 85.56 134.56 89.04 57.53 98.82 6.72 2.40 17.30 17.21 11.50 20.90 4.22 0.06 7.94
Senegal 8.91 7.60 10.30 37.20 33.63 41.50 89.35 78.65 101.07 81.24 65.37 93.38 16.72 11.90 20.20 14.85 11.10 20.60 5.96 3.63 7.27
Seychelles 8.35 6.60 9.90 5.82 0.00 15.85 30.75 17.77 49.86 79.94 73.80 82.98 4.35 2.00 8.10 8.16 0.00 24.20 3.74 2.29 5.83
Singapore 9.76 8.30 11.00 21.78 8.29 26.88 91.95 77.93 109.47 97.60 97.05 98.54 3.93 1.20 8.00 17.06 13.50 20.60 1.76 0.14 3.73
Slovak Republic 1998-2001 8.51 4.60 11.10 7.35 -0.75 9.51 80.02 56.22 100.77 99.55 97.24 99.97 9.01 2.50 31.60 14.62 6.60 22.40 3.09 1.27 4.34
South Africa 7.84 5.60 9.30 16.93 8.13 65.36 123.39 110.12 140.07 98.04 93.21 99.52 3.37 1.10 5.90 12.91 10.10 14.90 4.11 1.92 11.67
Spain 1998,2008-2011 6.84 5.90 8.50 22.92 18.07 27.44 133.76 119.11 143.87 98.53 96.98 99.26 2.01 0.70 5.30 11.99 11.00 12.90 1.89 0.87 2.58
Sri Lanka - - - 9.95 5.54 14.67 86.21 73.57 94.69 89.89 81.98 95.44 - - - 0.76 0.00 10.61 4.63 3.50 5.37
Swaziland 1998-1999 14.92 11.70 17.60 11.64 3.02 16.66 82.65 55.30 107.43 97.97 92.23 99.83 7.16 2.00 9.30 14.11 0.00 33.80 6.67 4.78 7.54
Sweden 2008-2011 5.11 4.70 6.50 19.47 16.66 23.03 133.63 0.00 241.00 97.40 96.75 98.22 1.42 0.60 2.60 10.18 7.00 12.70 1.37 0.90 2.00
Switzerland 2008-2011 5.17 4.30 6.00 7.46 3.73 9.23 121.20 111.05 135.92 99.30 98.67 99.84 1.85 0.30 5.20 13.34 11.30 17.90 0.91 0.51 1.35
Syrian Arab Republic - - - 4.09 0.00 12.72 26.31 0.00 42.11 62.87 50.97 80.48 - - - - - - 2.20 0.06 4.37
Tanzania 5.15 3.8 6.5 9.81 7.49 17.17 47.02 30.85 64.82 80.60 67.82 88.70 24.05 22.90 25.20 8.11 0.00 19.52 7.68 5.78 10.10
Thailand 1998-2000 8.41 5.90 11.30 3.02 0.08 4.45 103.38 90.13 148.18 97.74 97.05 98.62 13.96 2.90 42.90 13.48 10.90 16.00 2.51 0.73 3.56
Togo - - - 3.96 -1.43 8.91 82.91 61.30 125.56 80.85 68.78 95.74 - - - 11.30 0.00 22.30 4.80 2.15 9.76
Turkey 2000-2001 11.04286 5.2 15 6.22 -0.43 26.43 61.37 35.89 99.56 93.12 74.40 98.85 8.11 2.70 29.30 20.22 8.20 30.90 6.73 1.58 12.40
Uganda 11.6 7.000 15.800 15.02 10.85 19.91 61.09 46.33 83.81 53.59 29.84 66.74 5.77 2.10 20.20 18.85 11.00 23.10 10.59 6.72 13.39
United Kingdom 2007-2011 6.585714 4.4 9.9 11.04 4.62 18.72 99.60 99.33 99.95 99.60 99.33 99.95 2.44 0.90 4.00 13.56 12.60 15.90 1.37 0.91 2.25
United States 2007-2011 9.764286 8.4 11.2 22.82 19.87 25.65 77.21 69.55 83.22 89.75 79.21 95.50 2.00 0.70 5.40 13.24 12.20 15.30 3.70 3.07 5.45
Uruguay 2002-2004 9.791667 7.2 15.3 1.84 -3.78 3.17 82.77 55.76 125.90 72.90 56.57 86.57 7.41 1.00 33.90 16.51 10.20 22.70 5.04 -3.35 8.11
Venezuela, RB 11.84286 8.6 15.9 12.39 7.45 21.32 68.76 45.96 83.34 92.27 76.85 99.22 4.26 1.10 9.20 16.26 12.90 25.10 11.60 3.40 25.49
Zambia 1998 - - - 11.78 10.36 14.04 49.59 33.11 73.00 47.89 12.42 83.82 - - - 16.20 0.00 27.94 7.05 3.07 11.23
Summary Statistics:
Average 8.44 6.33 10.66 13.86 8.53 20.01 94.08 57.94 126.64 89.15 80.98 95.30 6.56 2.73 14.58 13.28 8.33 18.70 4.08 2.06 6.25
Std. Deviation 2.73 2.29 3.74 9.46 9.10 12.70 33.67 38.58 50.12 12.49 19.59 6.99 5.02 3.57 11.12 3.87 5.18 5.63 2.50 2.30 4.16
Max Crises 36
Max Countries 75
Max Observations 1050
Credit to Deposits Deposits to Total Assets Non-performing Loan %
Panel B comprises data on 75 countries over the period 1998 to 2011 as shown. Our dependent variable is driven by the Laeven and Valencia (2013) database with crisis years listed in column 2. For each of our key variables of interest we itemise Average, Minimum and 
Maximum values and provide overall sample statistics at the bottom of the Table.
Tier 1 Capital Ratio Net Interest Margin
TABLE 2  (Continued)
CAR Bank Z-Score
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GDP Growth Rate -0.093* -0.120** -0.223***
(0.052) (0.048) (0.066)
Terms of Trade Change -0.013 -0.001 -0.015
(0.012) (0.011) (0.014)
Depreciation of Currency 0.011 0.011 0.011
(0.010) (0.010) (0.013)
Real Interest Rate 0.036** 0.030*** 0.048**
(0.015) (0.011) (0.019)
Inflation 0.004 0.010 0.019
(0.011) (0.010) (0.015)
Surplus Govt. Budget to GDP % 0.018 0.000 0.028
(0.040) (0.035) (0.063)
M2 Money to Forex Reserves % -0.000 0.007
(0.000) (0.007)
Private Credit to GDP % 0.021** 0.034
(0.010) (0.022)
Ratio of bank liquid reserves to bank assets -0.018 -0.006
(0.018) (0.032)
Private Credit Growth rate, lagged 2 years -0.001 0.000
(0.002) (0.002)
Real GDP Per Capita -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Deposit Insurance Dummy Variable 2.266***
(0.706)
Constant -3.268*** -3.529*** -4.777***
(0.437) (0.519) (0.891)
Summary Results:
No. Observations 656 451 333
No. Systemic Crisis Episodes 28 27 21
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC Score) 196.0 150.7 100.6
Model Chi2 14.29 32.28 68.08
Total Correct In-Sample Predictions % 66.67 46.11 47.48
Correct Crisis Predictions % 67.86 70.37 80.95
Correct No-Crisis Predictions % 66.62 45.13 46.11
Degrees of Freedom 7 11 12
Model Significance - P Value 0.05 0.00 0.00
Log Likelihood Score -94.00 -69.36 -43.81
TABLE 3
This table replicates the first 3 regressions Demirguc-Kunt & Detragiache (1998) Table 2 
regressions. The dependent variable takes the value of "1" if a country experienced a systemic 
banking crisis in a year. The time frame covered by these regressions is 1980 to 1994 as per 
the original paper. The country composition is also the same as in 1998. The definition of what 
constitutes a systemic crisis comes from the definition supplied by the authors in 1998 plus a 
table of crisis events described in the paper. All rows for a country are removed after the first 
crisis is recorded due to endogeneity concerns post crisis. Statistical significance is denoted 
by ***, **, * for the 1%, 5%, 10% levels respectively. Robust standard errors clustered by 
country are reported in parentheses below the coefficients.
(1) (2) (3)
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GDP Growth Rate -0.116* -0.119* -0.132
(0.062) (0.064) (0.087)
Terms of Trade Change 0.004 -0.005 -0.023*
(0.012) (0.012) (0.014)
Depreciation of Currency -0.000 0.009 0.014*
(0.010) (0.007) (0.008)
Real Interest Rate 0.014 0.012 0.020**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
Inflation 0.001 -0.010 -0.013
(0.013) (0.012) (0.014)
Surplus Govt. Budget to GDP % -0.011 -0.004 0.036
(0.022) (0.024) (0.044)
M2 Money to Forex Reserves % -0.000 0.003***
(0.000) (0.001)
Private Credit to GDP % 0.007 0.015**
(0.005) (0.006)
Ratio of bank liquid reserves to bank assets -0.007 0.013
(0.010) (0.015)
Private Credit Growth rate, lagged 2 years -0.002* -0.001
(0.001) (0.002)
Real GDP Per Capita -0.000 -0.000 -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Deposit Insurance Dummy Variable 0.976**
(0.490)
Constant -2.768*** -2.664*** -3.529***
(0.299) (0.419) (0.647)
Summary Results:
No. Observations 1,080 785 608
No. Systemic Crisis Episodes 48 46 37
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC Score) 382.9 314.6 236.3
Model Chi2 13.59 16.03 86.21
Total Correct In-Sample Predictions % 55.24 38.33 40
Correct Crisis Predictions % 60.42 78.26 75.68
Correct No-Crisis Predictions % 55.01 36.54 38.39
Degrees of Freedom 7 11 12
Model Significance - P Value 0.06 0.14 0.00
Log Likelihood Score -187.5 -151.3 -111.7
TABLE 4
This table extends the results of Table 1.1 for a time span that now runs from 1980 - 2010. 
Refer to Table 1.1 for details. The dependent variable takes the value of "1" if a country 
experienced a systemic banking crisis in a year but comes from the Laeven and Valencia 
(2013 Updated) database. The country composition is also the same as in 1998. All rows for a 
country are removed after the first crisis is recorded due to endogeneity concerns post crisis. 
Statistical significance is denoted by ***, **, * for the 1%, 5%, 10% levels respectively. Robust 
standard errors clustered by country are reported in parentheses below the coefficients.
(1) (2) (3)
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GDP Growth Rate 0.041 -0.212*** -0.490*** -0.082 -0.198*** -0.274***
(0.094) (0.058) (0.190) (0.055) (0.033) (0.064)
Real Interest Rate 0.019* -0.006 -0.070 0.018*** -0.010 0.016
(0.010) (0.021) (0.047) (0.006) (0.013) (0.019)
Terms of Trade Change 0.004 0.018 -0.167*** -0.010 -0.002 -0.018
(0.013) (0.022) (0.063) (0.010) (0.012) (0.015)
M2 Money to Forex Reserves % -0.000 -0.002 0.004*** -0.001 -0.000 0.005***
(0.000) (0.012) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant -3.544*** -2.068*** -2.356*** -2.344*** -1.126*** -2.011***
(0.457) (0.345) (0.415) (0.319) (0.221) (0.278)
Summary Results:
No. Observations 470 262 223 537 525 588
No. Systemic Crisis Episodes 17 18 13 44 84 55
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC Score) 141.7 120.9 77.89 284.7 413.0 292.8
Model Chi2 5.000 16.73 42.97 17.37 43.52 72.40
Total Correct In-Sample Predictions % 22.74 43.77 71.12 36.36 50.33 72.91
Correct Crisis Predictions % 88.24 55.56 92.31 77.27 61.90 72.73
Correct No-Crisis Predictions % 20.77 43.09 69.86 33.49 48.48 72.92
Degrees of Freedom 4 4 4 4 4 4
Model Significance - P Value 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Log Likelihood Score -68.37 -57.95 -36.44 -139.8 -204.0 -143.9
TABLE 5
This table should be considred in conjunction with Table 1.4. We take the significant factors from Table 1.4 and subject them to a 
timeframe analysis, showing the importance of the analysis time-frame. Regression 1) covers the years 1980-1990, regression 2) covers 
1991-2000 and regression 3 covers the 2000 - 2010 timeframe. In regressions 4), 5) and 6) we repeat the same regressions but this time 
leave all crisis years in the panel. Whether or not a variable is a significant crisis determinant appears to be time (or business cycle) 
dependent. Statistical significance is denoted by ***, **, * for the 1%, 5%, 10% levels respectively. Robust standard errors clustered by 
country are reported in parentheses below the coefficients.
(1)               
(1980-1990)
(2)               
(1991-2000)
(3)               
(2001-2010)
(4)               
(1980-1990)
(5)               
(1991-2000)
(6)               
(2001-2010)
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Capital to Assets (Leverage) Ratio % -0.107 -0.080 0.055 0.079 -0.176
(0.115) (0.115) (0.115) (0.125) (0.194)
GDP Growth Rate -0.337*** -0.356*** -0.352*** -0.361*** -0.313*
(0.075) (0.079) (0.081) (0.085) (0.188)
Real Interest Rate 0.066** 0.067** 0.083* 0.091* 0.026
(0.031) (0.031) (0.044) (0.047) (0.243)
M2 Money to Forex Reserves % 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Private Credit to GDP % 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.028***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.009)
Deposit Insurance Dummy Variable 0.696 0.028
(0.621) (1.284)
House Price Index Growth Rate -0.320*
(0.176)
Constant -1.575** -1.911** -4.618*** -5.298*** -4.379**
(0.752) (0.784) (1.106) (1.390) (2.045)
Summary Results:
No. Observations 417 400 398 387 162
No. Systemic Crisis Episodes 24 24 24 24 13
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC Score) 151.0 142.2 133.1 132.2 58.66
Model Chi2 29.56 53.68 34.20 36.12 45.97
Total Correct In-Sample Predictions % 73.47 75.55 75.18 75.51 80.86
Correct Crisis Predictions % 70.83 75 79.17 79.17 84.62
Correct No-Crisis Predictions % 73.63 75.58 74.93 75.27 80.54
Degrees of Freedom 3 4 5 6 7
Model Significance - P Value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Log Likelihood Score -73.48 -68.62 -63.55 -62.60 -25.33
TABLE 6
This table introduces some modifications to Tables 1.3 and 1.4.  Non significant variables from Tables 
1.3 and 1.4 are omitted and some new sectoral specific variables are introduced including leverage ratio 
(capital to asset ratio) and house price index. The panel is panel A data (with time frame 1980 - 2010) 
and using the same countries as per Tables 1.3 and 1.4.  The definition of what constitutes a systemic 
crisis is based upon Laeven & Valencia (2013) as per Table 1.1.  All rows for a country are removed 
after the first crisis is recorded due to endogeneity concerns post crisis. Statistical significance is 
denoted by ***, **, * for the 1%, 5%, 10% levels respectively. Robust standard errors clustered by 
country are reported in parentheses below the coefficients.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
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Bank Z-Score -0.086** -0.106** -0.104* -0.105** -0.090* -0.113*
(0.044) (0.051) (0.055) (0.052) (0.048) (0.061)
Private Credit to GDP % 0.015*** 0.011** 0.011* 0.009 0.009 0.018**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009)
Private Credit Growth Rate lagged 2 years 0.008 -0.002 0.003 0.004 -0.002 0.002
(0.008) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011)
Bank Concentration -0.007 -0.008 -0.010 -0.011 -0.015 -0.012
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.011)
Bank Credit to Deposit Ratio 0.011** 0.007 0.005 0.003 0.000
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Bank Deposits to Total Assets Ratio 0.020 -0.003 0.066 0.047
(0.034) (0.034) (0.053) (0.056)
Net Interest Margin -0.196 -0.148 -0.156
(0.191) (0.166) (0.186)
Non-performing Loans to Total Loans % 0.137*** 0.131**
(0.050) (0.052)
Non-resident Loans to Total Loans % -0.008
(0.005)
Constant -3.139*** -3.798*** -5.171* -1.937 -6.595 -4.790
(0.573) (0.627) (3.013) (3.035) (5.803) (6.142)
Summary Results:
No. Observations 541 541 499 480 347 347
No. Systemic Crisis Episodes 35 35 35 35 35 35
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC Score) 143.3 138.9 129.4 127.1 112.3 111.5
Model Chi2 14.49 50.54 47.24 41.64 26.02 20.23
Total Correct In-Sample Predictions % 62.84 63.66 57.51 52.73 37.02 37.02
Correct Crisis Predictions % 80 88.57 88.57 85.71 85.71 88.57
Correct No-Crisis Predictions % 61.98 62.41 55.95 51.08 34.58 34.43
Degrees of Freedom 4 5 6 7 9 10
Model Significance - P Value 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03
Log Likelihood Score -69.16 -66.43 -61.18 -59.55 -50.64 -49.73
TABLE 7
This table reports the results of regressing bank Balance Sheet data against a binary dependent variable that 
takes the value of "1" if a country experiences a systemic banking crisis in a panel with one row per country / 
year combination and "0" otherwise. The panel is Panel B as described in Appendix 1 below, covering the 
period 1998 to 2011. The dependent variable data comes from Laeven & Valencia (2013 Updated) database of 
systemic banking crises. Bank Z Score data comes from the Financial Structures and development database 
(Demirguc-Kunt, Beck & Levine (2013). All rows for a country are removed from the panel after the first 
occurrence of a systemic banking crisis is recorded to mitigate feedback from dependent variable to control 
variables. Statistical significance is denoted by ***, **, * for the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Robust 
standard errors clustered by country in parentheses below the coefficients.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
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Bank Z-Score -0.069** -0.053
(0.031) (0.035)
Bank Credit to Deposit Ratio 0.009*** 0.009***
(0.003) (0.003)
Non-performing Loans to Total Loans % 0.094*** 0.068**
(0.023) (0.030)
Net Interest Margin -0.211** -0.231**
(0.098) (0.100)
GDP Growth Rate -0.235*** -0.142**
(0.046) (0.061)
Real Interest Rate 0.030* 0.040*
(0.016) (0.023)
Inflation 0.017** 0.028**
(0.007) (0.011)
Constant -2.969*** -2.783*** -2.908***
(0.732) (0.269) (0.778)
Summary Results:
No. Observations 511 732 511
No. Systemic Crisis Episodes 35 35 35
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC Score) 196.5 245.7 186.4
Model Chi2 32.63 42.94 36.13
Total Correct In-Sample Predictions % 41.53 76.64 47.81
Correct Crisis Predictions % 74.29 65.71 77.14
Correct No-Crisis Predictions % 39.89 77.19 46.34
Degrees of Freedom 4 3 7
Model Significance - P Value 0.00 0.00 0.00
Log Likelihood Score -95.76 -120.8 -89.19
TABLE 8
This table presents the control cluster results using Panel B data. The model is 
logistic with a binary systemic crisis dependent variable as driven by the Laeven & 
Valencia (2013) database. Regression 1 shows only sectoral variables all of which are 
significant. Regression 2 shows only macroeconomic variables which past research 
have shown to be consistently significant, as repeated here. Regression shows both 
sets of variables combined. Statistical significance is denoted by ***, **, * for the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels respectively. Robust standard errors clustered by country in 
parentheses below the coefficients.
(1) (2) (3)
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Capital to Assets (Leverage) Ratio % 0.079 0.131 0.079
(0.125) (0.434) (0.101)
GDP Growth Rate -0.361*** -0.517*** -0.361***
(0.085) (0.189) (0.085)
Real Interest Rate 0.091* 0.083 0.091**
(0.047) (0.187) (0.039)
M2 Money to Forex Reserves % 0.002*** 0.029 0.002**
(0.001) (0.028) (0.001)
Private Credit to GDP % 0.017*** 0.227*** 0.017***
(0.005) (0.081) (0.005)
Deposit Insurance Dummy Variable 0.696 -0.595 0.697
(0.621) (11.927) (0.672)
Constant -5.298*** -5.299***
(1.390) (1.309)
Summary Results:
No. Observations 387 154 387
No. Systemic Crisis Episodes 24 24 24
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC Score) 132.2 24.63 133.2
Model Chi2 36.12 53.12 31.33
Total Correct In-Sample Predictions % 75.51 7.071 75.51
Correct Crisis Predictions % 79.17 100 79.17
Correct No-crisis Predictions % 75.27 1.075 75.27
Model Degrees of Freedom 6 6 6
Model Significance - P Value 0.00 0.00 0.00
Log Likelihood Score -62.60 -9.314 -62.60
TABLE 9
This table illustrates a model robustness check. Compare the results with 
regression 4 of Table 1.6. In (1) the same values are reported where the model 
is estimated with pooled logit coefficients. In (2) the same variables are 
estimated using a Fixed Effects specification. In (3) a random effects 
specification is employed. (1) and (3) match closely with no tangible gain from 
the strong assumption of random effects models that individual effects are not 
correlated with the explanatory variables. The fixed effects model results in a 
large loss of observations and over-predicts crisis. Pooled logit is preferred (see 
Davis & Karim (2008))
(1) (2) (3)
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Benchmark UK USA Germany Sweden Russia
Bank Z-Score -0.090* -0.088* -0.120** -0.081* -0.090* -0.086*
(0.048) (0.051) (0.059) (0.046) (0.048) (0.052)
Private Credit to GDP % 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.010 0.009 0.010
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Private Credit Growth Rate lagged 2 years -0.002 -0.003 -0.008 -0.000 -0.002 -0.007
(0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.012) (0.013) (0.016)
Bank Concentration -0.015 -0.016 -0.012 -0.016 -0.015 -0.012
(0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Bank Credit to Deposit Ratio 0.003 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Bank Deposits to Total Assets Ratio 0.066 0.065 0.087 0.071 0.066 0.074
(0.053) (0.054) (0.070) (0.055) (0.053) (0.063)
Net Interest Margin -0.148 -0.166 -0.175 -0.125 -0.148 -0.221
(0.166) (0.169) (0.208) (0.166) (0.166) (0.187)
Non-performing Loans to Total Loans % 0.137*** 0.143*** 0.163*** 0.142*** 0.137*** 0.169***
(0.050) (0.052) (0.059) (0.051) (0.050) (0.065)
Constant -6.595 -6.527 -8.536 -7.258 -6.595 -6.895
(5.803) (5.863) (7.379) (5.875) (5.803) (6.402)
Summary Results:
No. Observations 347 340 340 339 347 339
No. Systemic Crisis Episodes 35 34 34 34 34 34
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC Score) 112.3 105.9 101.1 104.9 111.3 103.8
Model Chi2 26.02 26.35 28.10 28.60 26.02 21.17
Total Correct In-Sample Predictions % 37.02 37.40 37.26 37.45 37.31 37.73
Correct Crisis Predictions % 85.71 85.29 88.24 85.29 85.29 88.24
Correct No-crisis Predictions % 34.58 35.03 34.74 35.08 34.93 35.23
Model Degrees of Freedom 9 9 9 9 9 9
Model Significance - P Value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Log Likelihood Score -50.64 -47.95 -45.57 -47.45 -50.64 -46.88
TABLE 10
Country Removed
This table illustrates the effect of removing crisis episodes from the panel on a country by country basis. The benchmark regression is regression 
5 of Table 1.7. Then all observations for the UK are removed and the regression re-run. Having reinstated the UK observations, those for the United 
States are removed and the process repeated for each of Germany, Sweden and Russia. Standard errors are reported in parentheses below the 
coefficients. Significance levels are denoted by ***, ** and * at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Results are robust to country 
of origin effects.
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1 – Description of Variables in Panel A 
 
 
Variable 
Type 
Description and Source 
Dependent 
Variable – Crisis 
Binary 
Takes the value of 1 if a country experiences a systemic banking crisis in a 
particular year and 0 otherwise. This definition of a systemic crisis follows 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache’s (1998) definition as described in their paper. 
GDP Growth 
Rate 
Continuous 
Year on year growth rate of real (inflation adjusted) GDP. Source is the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) International Financial Statistics (IFS) 
database. Values are percentages and typically fall in the range  0 – 100 (i.e. 9% 
appears as 9 and not 0.09). The IFS code for this variable is NGDP_R. 
Calculate the GDP growth rate by using the following formula GDP Growth 
Rate i,t+1 = ((NGDP_R i,t+1– NGDP_R i,t) / NGDP_R i,t)*100 where “i” 
represents a country and “t” a year. 
Terms-of-trade 
Change 
Continuous 
Changes in the terms-of-trade. Source data comes from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicator (WDI) database. The indicator code is 
TT.PRI.MRCH.XD.WD with description “Net Barter Terms-of-trade Index” 
which is referred to in the following equation as NBTOTI. The formula used to 
calculate this field is:-  Terms-of-trade Change i,t+1 =  (NBTOTI i,t+1-  NBTOTI 
i,t) / NBTOTI i,t) * 100.  
Depreciation of 
Currency 
Continuous 
Year on year rate of change of the national currency to the US $ exchange rate 
(for USA use the Nominal Effective Exchange Rate as reported in the IFS 
database and as directed by Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998). The data is 
held in the IMF’s IFS database with code NUSD and with description 
“National Currency per US Dollar”. Formula used to calculate the figure is :- 
Depreciation of Currency i,t+1 =  ((NUSD i,t+1– NUSD i,t) / NUSD i,t)*100.  
Real Interest Rate 
% 
Continuous 
The real interest rate (inflation adjusted interest rate). Comes from the World 
Bank’s WDI database with variable code FR.INR.RINR which is described as 
Real Interest Rate %. An interest rate of, e.g. 2.5% is stored as 2.5 and not as 
.024. 
Inflation Continuous 
Level of inflation in percentage terms experienced by country “i” in year “t”. 
The data source is the IMF’s IFS database with code NGDP_D which has the 
corresponding description “Gross Domestic Product, Deflator”. Different 
values of this field are stored for different country / year combinations. I select 
only values that have the additional specification of “Percent Change over 
Corresponding Period of Previous Year”. Panel B uses an alternative source of 
inflation data where the source is the World Bank’s WDI database. The IFS 
values in Panel A are used to replicate Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) 
as faithfully as possible, whereas in Panel B the WDI data is more tractable and 
for that reason is preferred. 
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Appendix 1 – Description of Variables in Panel A 
 
 
Variable 
Type 
Description and Source 
Surplus Govt 
Budget to GDP % 
Continuous 
Represents the Government Current Account balance as a % of GDP. The data 
source is the World Bank’s WDI database. The data code for this variable is 
BN.CAB.XOKA.GD.ZS which has the description “Current Account Balance 
(% of GDP) as a description. Values are percentages such that a figure of, e.g. 
8% is stored as 8 and not as 0.08.  
M2 Money to 
Forex Reserves % 
Continuous 
The ratio of a country’s M2 (broad money supply) to its Foreign Exchange 
Reserves position. M2 money comes from the WDI database, with code 
FM.LBL.MQMY.CN which is described as “Money and quasi money (M2) 
(current Local Currency Units)”. This is converted to US $ using the prevailing 
rate of exchange (see Depreciation of Currency variable for data source). The 
Foreign Exchange Reserves are sourced via the IFS database with field code 
RAXGFX, described as “Foreign Exchange Reserves”. Several variants of this 
field are held, the one selected for the denominator in this ratio has the further 
description “US Dollars”. The ratio is then easily calculated. 
Private Credit to 
GDP % 
Continuous 
Level of private credit afforded by banks as a proportion of GDP. Data is in 
local currency for both numerator and denominator and comes from the IFS 
database. The relevant IFS code is 32D__ with description “Claims on Private 
Sector”. GDP is also from the IFS and is as described above. If data is not 
available for a particular year and country combination an alternative data 
source is the Financial Development and Structures Database (see Cihák, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, Feyen and Levine 2013)), field code “pcrdbgdp”.  
Ratio of bank 
liquid reserves to 
bank assets 
Continuous 
This ratio measures the level of bank liquid reserves (e.g. cash or assets easily 
converted to cash) as a percentage of total assets of the bank. Data is sourced 
via the World Bank’s WDI database. The code for the requisite field is 
FD.RES.LIQU.AS.ZS described as “Bank liquid reserves to bank assets ratio 
(%)”. In 1998 this field was calculated using several IFS variables – this WDI 
value used here is more accessible. 
 
 
Private Credit 
Growth Rate 
 
 
Continuous 
This variable measures the growth rate in the levels of indebtedness of the 
private sector of an economy from the previous year to the current year. The 
data in Panel A comes from three separate sources. In order of priority these are 
1) Financial Development and Structures Database  (see Cihák et al. (2013)), 
field code is “pcrdbgdp” 2) World Bank’s WDI Database data on private credit 
growth rates (access code FM.AST.DOMS.CN and 3) IMF’s IFS database with 
code 22D described as “claims on private sector” .  
Real GDP per-
capita 
Continuous 
Measures the average level of wealth per person in a country in a given year in 
US$. The data is sourced via the World Bank’s WDI database with variable code 
NY.GDP.PCAP.KD described as “GDP per-capita (Constant US$)”. 
 
Deposit Insurance 
 
Binary 
Takes the value of 1 if country “i” has an explicit (i.e. has procured via an 
insurance policy) deposit insurance scheme in place for banking sector deposits 
in year “t” and 0 otherwise. The data for this variable comes from two sources 
which are, in order of priority 1) Deposit Insurance around the world database 
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Appendix 1 – Description of Variables in Panel A 
 
 
Variable 
Type 
Description and Source 
Dummy Variable by Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2005) and 2) Bank Regulation and Supervision 
Database (see Barth et al. (2013)). The first dataset formalises the data supplied 
by Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) and extends the data to 2003. The 
second dataset covers the period from 1999 to 2011 over which period the data 
for 4 regulatory surveys, which included questions on deposit insurance 
schemes in situ in 180 countries, are provided.  
 
 
Capital-to-asset 
(Leverage) Ratio 
 
 
Continuous 
A ratio used to measure how leveraged a bank is, in that the bank’s assets (the 
bulk of which are loans they have extended) are financed via capital. This ratio 
is a measure of the proportion of the asset base of the bank that has been 
financed by capital (owners equity, retained earnings etc.) versus how much of 
the financing for the assets that has come from debt. Here assets are not risk 
weighted in any way however some academics believe this simpler measure of 
the loss absorbing ability of a bank’s capital is more informative and less prone 
to manipulation than the more complicated Tier – 1 Capital ratio. Panel A has a 
timeframe extending from 1980 to 2010, as such the only viable source for 
leverage ratio data extending back that far is the World Economic Outlook’s  
Financial Development database, field code “GFDD.SI.03”.    
 
House Price Index 
Growth Rate 
 
Continuous 
Representing the growth in house prices (in % terms) year over year in a 
country. The purpose of this variable is to help capture the risk to the banking 
system of real-estate prices over-heating / property bubbles. Data for this 
variable is quite scarce and limited primarily to the OECD countries although 
additional data has been provided by the Bank for International Settlements in 
recent years. This is why the number of observations in the table drops off 
whenever this variable is included. I use the BIS data as the primary source of 
data, supplemented where possible via data provided by the OECD.  
 
Alternative 
Dependent 
Variable – crisis 
dummy variable 
#2 
 
 
Binary 
The source for this data is Laeven and Valencia’s (2013) dataset that 
accompanies their 2012 IMF Working Paper entitled “Systemic Banking Crises 
Database: An Update”. The dataset provides worksheets for Crises Years, 
including the country name, start date of a systemic banking crisis, fiscal cost of 
the crisis, whether support was provided by the sovereign and other useful data. 
The definition of a systemic banking crisis is more rigorous than that outlined 
by Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998). Two conditions have to be 
simultaneously met “1. Significant signs of financial distress in the banking 
system (as indicated by significant bank runs, losses in the banking system, 
and/or bank liquidations)” and “2) Significant banking policy intervention 
measures in response to significant losses in the banking system”.  
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Appendix 2 – Description of Variables in Panel B 
(Note, only those variables not already described in Appendix 1 are described here) 
Variable 
Variable 
Type 
Description and Source 
 
Bank Credit to 
Bank Deposit % 
 
Continuous 
This ratio essentially measures the extent of loan levels as a proportion of the 
banks deposit base. (An alternative view is how many times on average a euro of 
deposit money has been loaned out.) Data comes from the Financial 
Development and Structures Database (see Cihák et al. (2013)), field code 
“bcbd – Bank Credit to Bank Deposits (%)”. 
Bank Z Score Continuous 
A measure of risk incorporating earnings and capital adequacy into one value. The 
term is defined as Bank Z Score t = (Return on Assets t + Capital Asset Ratio t) / 
(Standard Deviation of Return on Assets).  The value returned is sometimes 
described as a “Distance to Default” measure, thus larger values imply further 
distance to default and consequently a less risky bank profile. The denominator 
incorporates the return on assets over a period of time (depending upon 
availability of data). Data for this variable comes from two sources, the primary 
source is the WEO Financial Development Database (code = GFDD.SI.01 
“Bank Z-score”), supplemented where possible by data aggregated to country 
level from individual bank level data held in Bankscope. The country level Bank Z 
score is aggregated based upon asset weights. 
Bank 
Concentration 
Continuous 
Measures proportion of total assets in a banking system held by the 3 largest 
banks. Data is sourced via the Financial Development and Structures database 
(see Cihák et al. (2013)), field code “concentration”.   
Net Interest 
Margin 
Continuous 
The difference between what a bank earns as loan interest income and what it 
pays to depositors (both individual and institutional). It is a useful indirect 
measure of earnings but also acts as a proxy for interest rate risk as banks may 
have lent on fixed rates or have tied loan products to LIBOR or central bank 
lending rates (e.g. “tracker” mortgages).  Source data from Financial Development 
and Structures database (see Cihák et al. (2013)) field code “netintmargin”. 
Non-performing 
loans to Total 
Loans % 
Continuous 
The percentage of total loans in the banking sector that are at risk of being 
written-off, usually defined as loan repayments have not been made for 90 days or 
more. Source data from World Economic Outlooks Financial Development 
Database, field code GFDD.SI.02.  
Non-resident 
loans to GDP % 
Continuous 
A measure of competition in the banking sector and degree to which financial 
liberalisation has progressed. Also a proxy for the potential exposure of the 
banking system to a reversal of capital flows as non-resident banks leave stressed 
markets. Source data from Financial Structures and Development Database (see 
Cihák et al. (2013)) field code “nrbloan”. 
 
